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OFF- BALANCE SIIEET ACTIVITY, MARKET- DETEIUrfINED AND
 
ACCOUNTING-DETE~~NED STOCK PRICES OF COMMERCIAL Bl~S
 
ABSTRACT 
The rapid growth of OBSA in recent years has concerned bank regulators that 
such OBSA are risk-increasing and should be brought under control through
additional capital requirements. Previous empirical literature tested the 
riskiness of certain OBSA by employing systematic or total risk as dependent
variables, and documented that some OBSA may reduce bank risk. This paper 
reexamines the relationship between market values, accounting values of bank 
stock and OBSA. This paper tests the implication of OBSA on market values of 
bank equity by employing a generalized Gordon-type stock valuation model. The 
results support the hypothesis that book values of equity predict market values 
of bank stock siunificantly, and OBSA do not appear to influence market values 
of bank stock. Because diversified investors are concerned with sYstematic risk 
and hence market values of equities, additional capital requirements of OBSA may
be inappropriate. 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between book 
values, market values and off-balance sheet activities (OBSA) of commercial 
banks of various sizes by employing a generalized Gordon-type stock valuation 
model. 
Bank regulators are concerned with the dramatic proliferation of 
off-balance sheet activities (OBSA) and their risk-exposure. Moreover, the 
regulators have proposed that some OBSA be included in the calculation of a 
risk-based capital requirement. The regulatory presumption is that such OBSA 
are risk-increasing. Whether such contention is justified remains an open 
question. 
Bank regulators examine accounting information to determine the solvency of 
a banking institution. Empirical research generally supports the hypothesis 
that accounting information is a surrogate of market information. OBSA are not 
summarized on the balance sheet but are instead given in the verbal footnotes to 
balance sheets. However, banks are required to report such activities to the 
FDIC beginning 1984. In off-balance sheet transactions, banks earn fee incomes 
instead of interest spreads, and loans are not held on the books. 
Two main effects of OBSA on risk, namely diversification and leverage 
effects, have been rationalized in theoretical literature. According to 
diversification effects, banks engage in OBSA to diversify their asset 
portfolios and achieve within-firm diversification. The leverage effects of 
OBSA imply that such activities augment potential leverage and hence increase 
risk (Pavel [1987J, Benveniste and Berger [1986J). Empirical literature tested 
such diversification and leverage effects of OBSA by employing market risk 
(beta) or total risk (variability of market equity return) as dependent 
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variables and hence indirectly documented the impact of OBSA on market values of 
bank equities (Hassan [1990] and Hassan [1991]). This study tests directly the 
premium or discount that OBSA imposes on market values of bank equities. 
This research consists of five sections. Section 2 discusses previous 
literature on the relationship between accounting and market information, and 
significance of this study. The empirical methodology and hypotheses are 
discussed In Section 3. Section 4 analyzes data and presents empirical results. 
A summary of the study's major conclusions and policy evaluations appears in 
Section 5. 
2. Previous Research and Significance of this Study 
The relationships between book and market values of bank stocks have been 
documented across several dimensions. Durand [1957] was one of the first to 
examine the relationship between the market value and book value of bank stocks. 
This study documented that the book value of the sample bank equities was the 
most important determinant of their market price. 
A pioneering study by Beaver, Kettler and Scholes [1970] examines the 
relationships, using simple correlations, between a firm's market determined 
beta and single indicators of financial policy. They found significant 
correlation between beta and dividend payout, financial leverage and an 
"accounting" beta which measures the covariability of a firm's earnings with 
earnings of all firms. In addition, the study modeled the market beta as a 
function of several accounting measures for the purpose of forecasting the 
market beta. They found that accounting data provided superior forecasts of the 
market determined risk measure for the time period examined. 
Pettway [1976] investigated the impact of banks' capital position on (1) 
the risk premium of the bank's capital notes, (2) the bank's beta, and~ (3) the 
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price-earnings (PIE) ratio, during the 1971-74 perid. His cross-sectional study 
indicated that dividend yield, payout ratio and earnings gro~{th are significant 
in explaining the variability of price-earnings ratios. He also found no 
apparent relationship between beta and these accounting variables for large 
banks prior to 1974 and slightly significant inverse relationships after 1974. 
A study by Beighley, Boyd and Jacobs [1979J examined the relationship 
between financial leverage and stock price for 113 bank holding companies for 
the periods 1972 through 1974. By using a three month average of bank stock 
price as the dependent variable, they found that dividends, earnings growth, 
firm size and loan loss rate were the most important determinants of the market 
prices of bank equities. They also found that for the given sample of bank 
holding companies, the higher a bank's degree of financial leverage at a point 
in time, the lower is the bank's stock price, after controlling for bank size, 
earnings growth, dividends and loan losses. 
Jahankhani and Lynge [1980J investigated the relationship bet~{een financial 
policies of commercial banks and two market-determined measures of risk. 
Financial policies are proxied by average balance sheet and income statement 
data over the period 1972-1976 for 95 commercial banks and bank holding 
companies. Accounting data measures of financial leverage, liquidity, dividend 
payout ratio, loan loss experience and variability in earnings and deposits are 
used. These are related to a measure of systematic risk (beta) and total risk 
(standard deviation of equity return) also calculated for the same five-year 
period. Bivariate and multivariate relationships are examined. As independent 
variables used to explain beta, the coefficients of the dividend payout ratio, 
variability of deposits and the loan to deposit ratio are significant. In 
explaining total risk the coefficients of the dividend payout ratio, a financial 
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leverage measure, variability of deposits and earnings, a loan loss measure and 
a liquidity measure are all significant. 
Kamath [1980] examines the relationship between commercial bank stock 
equity premium (or discount) and 16 variables representing the bank's 
profitability, systematic and unsystematic risk, marketability, grmvth and 
dividend policy. The analysis suggests that four variables, namely, the return 
on equity, the beta coefficient, the volume of stock trading and the gro\vth of 
net asset value, statistically have the most influence upon the premium or 
discount on bank stocks. A seven variable multiple regression model Ivas able to 
account for about 75% of the variability in the price to book ratio in each of 
the years from 1974 to 1976. 
None of these bank studies include OBSA as explanatory variables. But 
inclusion of OBSA in such accounting-based models can help analyze their impact 
on the market values of bank equities. 
Lynge and Lee [1987J used accounting-based risk-forecasting models to 
investigate the impact of OBSA on both equity risk and systematic risk for large 
commercial banks for the time period 1984-85 for a sample of 81 large banks. 
The estimated coefficients of independent variables incorporating anSA are 
statistically significant in models explaining total risk but not significant In 
models explaining systematic risk. 
Brewer, Koppenhaver and Wilson [BKV, 1986] used a two- factor CAP~I model 
that estimates systematic risk associated Ivith income, balance sheet and OBSA. 
BI(1{ contend that OBSA is a proxy for overall bank quality and good management. 
This explains why beneficiaries are willing to hold the contingent claims that 
banks issue. Further, they find that certain forms of OBSA (standby letters of 
credit) actually decrease the risk of diversified bank shareholders due to the 
market discipline that the guarantee beneficiaries impose on bank management. 
Finally, the results of BK1Y indicate that loan commitments and commercial 
letters of credit are not priced in the equity market. Thus their issuance did 
not appear to increase the risk of the bank. 
~Iost recently, Unal and Kane [1987J used a statistical market value
 
accounting model (S~WAM) to explain the market values of bank equities into
 
market values of its recorded and unrecorded net assets. An adjustment factor
 
is used to estimate the net market value of on-balance items. The unrecorded
 
. equities, defined as the difference betveen unbooked assets and liabilities, is 
termed as "off-balance sheet items." By regressing market values of bank 
equities on book values of their net worth, Unal and Kane found that large banks 
show a market premium over book equity prior to 1980, but rarely thereafter. 
~Iedium banks show a market discount over book equity until 1983 and small banks 
until 1985. They also show the market value of unrecorded equity to be 
significantly negative prior to 1980 (across bank size) but insignificant 
thereafter. 
Although Unal and Kane [1987J explained deposit-insurance guarantees as an 
unrecorded component of equity, they did not explicitly consider 
deposit-insurance subsidies in regression analysis. However, they mentioned the 
possibility of specification problem in their analysis. By introducing OBSA In 
regression analysis, this paper seeks to recify such problem. 
The empirical literature, to date, has failed to account for the effects of 
OBSA on the market values of bank equities. It is \;ell-documented in literature 
that accounting values contain significant predictive power from which to 
ascertain market values. This study will report on tvo tests. First, this 
study will investigate the effects of anSA on market values of bank equities by 
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employing a generalized Gordon-type model that includes, in addition to OBSA, 
several accounting variables used in past empirical research. Second, this 
research will focus on the association bet,~een book values and market values of 
bank equities. From these tests, it can be empirically determined whether 
overall OBSA has acted as a deflator or inflator for market values of equities. 
Only if OBSA acts as a deflator can federal regulators seemingly assume that 
this portion of bank activities is in need of additional regulation (presumably 
in the form of risk-based capital guidelines). If, on the other hand, overall 
OBSA activity acts as an inflator of bank market value, regulators should 
reconsider the potentially adverse effects of increased capital requirements on 
the chosen risk-stance of the bank. If OBSA are insignificantly correlated ,.ith 
market values of equities, it can also be ascertained that well-diversified 
investors do not price such OBSA and, therefore, proposed capital requirements 
of OBSA may be inappropriate. 
3. Methodology and Hypotheses 
The standard constant dividend growth model (commonly referred to as the 




Po = current price,
 
Do = current dividend per share,
 
g = expected growth of dividends, Md
 
k = appropriate discount rate.
 
Equation (1) implies that the price of the common stock is a function of 
three basic factors: the expected cash dividend, expected growth rate of the 
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dividend stream, and the required rate of return corresponding to the firm's 
risk class. 
Po is the equilibrium stock price. Trading will occur only to the extent 
that investors hold divergent beliefs about k and g and the equilibrium price 
will change only as events alter the market's perception of k and g. 
As the pricing factors in equation (1) are not directly observable, proxy 
variables for k and g must be developed as surrogates. Because proxy measures 
are used, it cannot be expected that the specific functional form of the 
equations will be maintained. A more general form can be adopted for empirical 
purposes: 
Po = f(do' g', k'), where: 
~o ~o ~o 
(2)oa- > 0, 0k7 < °and ~ > 0. 
o 0 
For purposes of convenience In empirical testing, the relationship can be 
assumed to be linear. The signs of partial derivatives are those that are 
expected, based on equation (2) and assuming that~k' and g' are good proxy 
measures. 
The following generalized Gordon-type model will be used to test the effect 
of OBSA On market value of equity: 
? + + 
Pm = f(OBSA, Pb, lev, payout, p, ~re' lnloss). (3) 
where 
Pm = market value of bank share X number of shares; 
onSA = ag~regate of reported contingent liabilities from all forms of 
OB~A except interest rate s\{aps. This aggregate is deflated by 




Pb = book value of equity per share X number of shares; 
lev = book value ratio of liabilities to assets;
 
Payout = ratio of dividend per share to ernings per share;
 
P = accounting determined bank beta;
 
~re = standard deviation of return on book equity;
 
Inloss = provision for loan losses. 
The expected partial derivatives are shown above each variable in equation (3). 
All right-hand variables except DBSA in equation (3) are balance-sheet 
variables. These variables are developed to capture the three fundamental 
factors embodied in equation (2). 
Two main effects of DBSA on risk and hence on market value of equity: 
namely diversification and leverage effects, are rationalized in theoretical 
literature. Diversification effects are expected to increase equity values 
while leverage effects to decrease equity values. However, a priori, it is 
difficult to say which effect dominates. 
Pb is expected to be positively related to Pm because there is sufficient 
evidence in empirical literature that book values of equity predict market 
values of equity reasonably well. 
The "lnloss represents the probability of future defaults that may be 
expected to reduce earnings and dividend. Therefore, Inloss will affect Pm 
negatively. 
Dividend stabilization policy implies that firms are reluctant to change 
dividends drastically, and, in particular to cut dividends once a certain level 
has been established. Therefore, high dividend payouts are associated with low 
risk and hence high market values of equities. 
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Banks use a high degree of financial leverage. Because a higher degree of 
leverage increases financial risk, lev is inversely related to market values of 
equity. 
Standard deviation of bo~k equity return (~re) is an accounting-risk 
measure. Rapid growth identifies with high risk and low market values of 
equities. Similarly, accounting beta (fi) is a good surrogate of market beta. A 
high accounting beta translates into a higher return by stockholders and lower 
market values of equities. 
A pooled cross-section and time-series econometric technique is used to 
test the following two hypotheses: 
Hypotheses one: H o : OBSA does not significantly affect Pm 
Hi: OBSA does significantly affect Pm 
Hypothesis two: H o : Pb is not significant in determining Pm 
Hi: Pb is significant in determining Pm 
4. Data Analysis and Empirical Results 
4.1 Data Analysis 
The Compustat Data Tapes were used to obtain the observed values of Pm' 
payout, and the net income and average total asset amounts used in calculating 
the accounting beta. Return on average equity was also calculated from 
Compustat. The standard deviation of return on average equity is based on six 
annual observations between 1983 and 1988. Because accounting returns are 
deflated by a market index, accounting betas are actually a hybrid. The CRSP 
Equally-Veighted index was selected and annualized for use as the market index. 
Karels and Sackley [1991J show that accounting betas calculated with this index 
provide a more positive correlation with market-determined betas than other 
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accounting-derived or market-derived indices. An accounting beta Has calculated 
for each bank using 11 annual observations from 1977 through 1988. 
All remaining data items were obtained from the FDIC Data Tapes containing 
the Call and Income Reports. The leverage variable was calculated as the 
difference between the value one and the equity/asset ratio, defined by total 
assets. The OBSA variable is a composite of the 18 reported figures comprising 
Schedule RC-L (Commitments and Contingencies). 
4.2 Empirical Results 
Descriptive statistics of the regression variables are presented in 
Table 1. Table 2 presents correlations among all independent variables and 
dependent variables used in regression analysis. Book values of equities (Pb) 
show positive association and variability of book equity return (~re) shol's 
negative association with market values of equities at the 5% significance 
level. The remaining variables, except payout, exhibit expected signs but are 
not significant at the 5% level. These bivariate relationships provide credence 
to the explanatory power of independent accounting risk measures to predict 
market values of bank equities. 
The independent accounting risk variables, in general, are not highly 
correlated with one another, indicating that multicolinearity is not a serious 
problem.. However, variability of book equity return ShOH positive correlations 
with both 'leverage (lev) and accounting betas (fi). These results are not 
surprising since leverage (lev) increases equity variance and leverage 
influences accounting betas. Loan-loss provision (lnloss) variable shol's 
negative correlation with dividend payout (payout), indicating that high loan 
losses are associated with 10Her dividend payouts, all other things being the 
same. 
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Table 3 presents pooled cross-section and time-series results of empirical 
model (3). All explanatory variables except lnloss have expected signs. Book 
values of equity (Pb) act a premium over market values of equity and is 
significant at the 1% level. OBSA shows neither premium or discount over market 
values of equity and is insignificant. Leverage (lev) and accounting beta (fi) 
discounts market equity values and are statistically significant. ',nile 
dividend payout (payout) and variability of book equity return (~re) retain 
their expected signs but these are not statistically significant. 
Loan loss reserve (lnloss) has the perverse coefficient and is significant. 
One possible explanation for this result is that investors may actually have a 
preference for banks which exhibit aggressiveness in their lending practices, 
despite its short-term detrimental effects. 
The results of this research are consistent \vith those of others. Like 
Kamath [1980J and Pettway [1976J, book-values of equities (Pb) , leverage ratio 
(lev), dividend payout (payout) and beta (fi) are significant in explaining 
market values of equities. However, this research improves upon the existing 
empirical literature by including off-balance sheet contingent items (OBSA) and 
empirically examining the impact of OBSA on market values of bank equities. 
The results compare favorably \vith those of Unal and Kane [1987J. 
Off- balance sheet activities (OBSA) shmv insignificant relationship with market 
value of equities. This study is an improvement over Unal and Kane, at least 
technically, because while Unal and Kane mention off-balance sheet items but do 
not explicitly analyze their impact, this research includes OBSA in regression 
results. However, this paper and Unal and Kane arrive at the same conclusion 
that OBSA activities are not significant predictors of market values of bank 
stocks across all sizes after 1980s. 
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5. Summary and Conclusions 
The primary purpose of this paper has been to examine the influence of 
off-balance sheet activities (OBSA) on market values of bank stocks. By 
applying a pooled cross-section and time-series econometric technique to 
estimate a generalized Gordon-type model of bank stock valuation, it appears 
that OBSA does not affect market values of equities and book values of equity 
are significant predictors of market values of bank equities. However, 
accounting risk variables such as book values of equity, leverage ratio, 
accounting beta and loan loss provision appear to be significant predictors of 
bank stock valuation. A pooled cross-section time-series is employed so that 
intertemporal movements and interbank difference can be considered 
simultaneously and the data base can also be extended. Such technique is of 
particular interest to this research because cross-section or time-series data 
alone (16 cross-section and 6 time-perios) do not yield sufficient degrees of 
freedom in regression analysis. 
Due to a well-established relatinship between book and market-determined 
bank stock values, the regulatory proposal to control OBSA through risk-based 
capital requirements may be inappropriate. The results show that OnSA, in 
general, are insignificant predictors of market values of equities. Therefore, 
such OBSA are not a concern for diversified investors. There is some evidence 
that certain widely-issued forms of contingent liabilities do not increase but 
actually decrease the riskiness of individual banks. The current findings, in 
addition to past evidence, imply that regulatory interference of OBSA in the 
form of additional capital requirements may create distortions in banking 
off-balance sheet capital market. 
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OilSA - 0 .1085 1.0000 
Pb 0.9369 - 0.1395 1.0000 
lev - 0.0837 - 0.0782 0.0421 1.0000 
payout -0.0092 - 0 .1806 -0.0147 - 0.0767 1.0000 
(J - 0.1135 0.0086 0.0207 0.1941 0.0129 1.0000 
(Tre - 0 .4304 - 0.0738 - 0.3393 0.3251 -0.1285 0.63085 1.0000 
lnloss - 0.0786 - 0.0786 - 0.1206 - 0.0309 - 0.4399 0.01308 0.1053 1.000 
P 
m 
OilSA Ph lev payout (J (Tre lnloss 
TABLE 3 
POOLED CROSS SECTION TIME SERIES REGRESSION RESULTS 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT t-RATIO 
Constant 1544.4 3.512 *** 
Pb 1.0554 21. 524 *** 
lev -1625.1 - 3.4369 *** 
payout 5.1944 0.99745 
fJ -5428.0 -4.2545 *** 
iJ're - 250.55 - 0.75971 
lnloss 0.0016477 1. 9722 ** 







F 78.606 *** 17. 
88 D.F. 
TABLE 4 
LIST OF SAMPLE llANKS 
1. Baybanks Inc. 
2. Central Fidelity Banks Inc. 
3. Colorado National Bankshares 
4. Cullen/Frost Bankers Inc. 
5. Dauphin Deposit Corp. 
6. First Alabama Bancshares Inc. 
7. First Florida Banks Inc. 
8. First of America Bank Corp. 
9. First Virginia Banks Inc. 
10. Mercantile Bancorporation 
11. Mercantile Bankshares Corp. 
12. NBD Bancorp 
13. Sunwest Financial Services Inc. 
14. Trustcorp 
15 . United j[issouri Bankshares 
16. Zions Bancorporation 
